Aspirations, adaptive learning and cooperation in repeated games

Game Theory;Repeated Games

Community Networks and the Growth of Private Enterprise in China

This paper identifies and quantifies the role played by birth-county-based community networks in the growth of private enterprise in China. We develop a network-based model that generates predictions for the dynamics of firm entry, concentration, and firm size across birth counties with varying social connectedness (measured by population density). These predictions are verified over the 1990-2009 period with administrative data covering the universe of registered firms. Competing non-network-based explanations can explain some, but not all, of the results. Moreover, supplementary evidence indicates that network spillovers occur within the birth county and, going down even further, within clans within the county. Having validated the model, we estimate its structural parameters and conduct counter-factual simulations, which estimate that entry over the 1995-2004 period would have been 40% lower (with a comparable decline in the stock of capital) in the absence of community networks. Additional counter-factual simulations shed light on misallocation and industrial policy in economies where networks are active

Complexity of Strong Implementability

We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice. This is one of the central questions in mechanism design. If the concept of weak implementation is considered, the Revelation Principle states that one can restrict attention to truthful implementations and direct revelation mechanisms, which implies that implementability of a social choice function is easy to check. For the concept of strong implementation, however, the Revelation Principle becomes invalid, and the complexity of deciding whether a given social choice function is strongly implementable has been open so far. In this paper, we show by using methods from polyhedral theory that strong implementability of a social choice function can be decided in polynomial space and that each of the payments needed for strong implementation can always be chosen to be of polynomial encoding length. Moreover, we show that strong implementability of a social choice function involving only a single selfish individual can be decided in polynomial time via linear programming

Declining Clientelism of Welfare Benefits? Targeting and Political Competition based Evidence from an Indian State

It has been argued that since 2014, under the BJP-led central government, welfare benefits in India have become better targeted and less prone to clientelistic control by state and local governments. Arguably this has helped to increase the vote share of the BJP vis-a-vis regional parties. We test these hypotheses using longitudinal data from 3500 rural households in the state of West Bengal. We fail to find evidence that the new “central” programs introduced after 2014 were better targeted than traditional “state” programs, or that the targeting of state programs improved after 2014. Households receiving the new “central” benefits introduced since 2014 were more likely to switch their political support to the BJP. However, changes in the scale, composition or targeting of these programs, in clientelistic effectiveness of traditional state programs or in household incomes, fail to account for the large observed increase in the voters’ support for the BJP. Non-Hindus, especially recent immigrant nonHindus, were much less likely to switch support to the BJP, even after controlling for benefits received and changes in household incomes. Our results suggest that ideology and identity politics were more important factors explaining the rising popularity of the BJP

Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers’ farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk

Low-temperature behaviour of ammonium ion in buddingtonite [N(D/H) 4 AlSi 3 O 8 ] from neutron powder diffraction

The structural response of buddingtonite [N(D/H) 4 AlSi 3 O 8 ] on cooling has been studied by neutron diffraction. Data have been collected from 280 K down to 11 K, and the crystal structure refined using the Rietveld method. Rigid-body constraints were applied to the ammonium ion to explore the structural properties of ammonium in the M-site cavities at low-temperature. Low-temperature saturation is observed for almost all the lattice parameters. From the present in situ low-temperature neutron diffraction studies, there is no strong evidence of orientational order–disorder of the ammonium ions in buddingtonite.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/46909/1/269_2004_Article_425.pd

Taking the detour

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115976/1/jhm2424.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115976/2/jhm2424-sup-0001-suppinfo.pd